

NFC for Free Rides and Rooms (on your phone)



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PREVIEW DECK (Not for distribution)



Affected systems we know of have been contacted in Dec 2011 and March 2012, given detailed information and remediation recommendations

NFC Transit Overview



- Who's using it
 - Stateside
 - Transit (SF, Boston, DC, Seattle, NJ, Salt Lake City, Chicago, Philadelphia). NOT NEW YORK!
 - Known cities we've contacted: NJ Path, SF Muni
 - Overseas implementations
 - Malaysia, Hong Kong, London, Germany, Dubai, Madrid, etc.
- Benefits for Transit Agencies
 - Faster
 - Auto refill
 - Track riders

What's in a Tag






- Coil Antenna
 - powered by reader
 - inductive-coupling
- Integrated Circuit "IC"
 - Logic
 - Command set
 - Memory
 - 64 bytes to 8KB

What's a Reader



- RFID @ 13.56 MHz
 - ISO 14443-1:4
 - Powers passive tags
 - Short range
 - Initialization and anti-collision
- Sends commands to cards
 - Read or Write commands
 - Typically to a sector
 - Slow baud rate
 - 106 kbps to 848 kbps





- Many phone are also NFC Readers
 - Android (Nexus S, 7, Galaxy S3),
 Blackberry (Bold 9930), Nokia, Windows Phone...
 - Can emulate tags too
 - More on that later...









RFID Transit Cards





- Top:
 - Mifare DESFire
 - Supports Access Control
 - Separate read/write keys
- Bottom:
 - Mifare Ultralight
 - No Access Control

RFID Transit Cards





— Mifare Ultralight

Mifare DESFire



Choosing the right type of tag is IMPORTANT!!!

- Not all tags support the same features
 - Might need to be used in different ways

Ultralight breakdown




	Byte Number	0	1	2	3	Page
Static Lock bytes —	UID / Internal	UID0	UID1	UID2	Internal0	0
OTP area - Capability Container (CC)	Serial Number	UID3	UID4	UID5	UID6	1
	Internal / Lock	Internal1	Internal2	Lock0	Lock1	2
1 st Data Area Byte at Page 4 Byte 0	OTP-CC	OTP0-CC0	OTP1-CC1	OTP2-CC2	OTP3-CC3	3
	Data	Data0	Data1	Data2	Data3	4
	Data	Data4	Data5	Data6	Data7	5
	Data	Data8	Data9	Data10	Data11	6
	Data					7
Read/Write Data Area	Data					8
	Data					9

- Ultralight Memory Layout AN1303 document from NXP
 - Read/Write data area starting at Page 4 can be altered by all users

Analyzing Cards





View a Mifare
Ultralight tag with
Android

- NFC TagInfo
 - NFC Research Lab Hegenberg
- Permissions are color coded
 - Red locked pages
 - Green not locked

No Access Ctrl, but OTP



 EEPROM: 512 bits are organized in 0x16 pages with 4 bytes each. 80 bits are reserved for manufacturer data. 16 bits are used for the read-only locking mechanism.
 32 bits are available as OTP area. 384 bits are user programmable read/write memory.

OTP = One Time Programmable

- Area in Page 3 which bits can be set once
 (1b), but never unset (0b)
- This area was envisioned to be used for ticketing systems (if all tickets are of equal value). Each 32 bits can represent one "ride". A time of purchase, the correct value of "rides" left is set.
- The amount of "rides" is decremented each time and can not be reused once all are gone.






8 "rides" remain (0x00)

7 "rides" remain (0x80)

3 "rides" remain (0xF8)



OTP on Transit Cards



East Coast vs West Coast

Memory content [00] * 04:79:3B CE (UID0-UID2, BCC0) [01] * 52:CE:20:80 (UID3-UID6) 3C 48 00.00 (BCC1 INT LOCKO-LOCK1) [03] . 00:00:00:00 (OTP0-OTP3) . OA O4 OO A8 | . 1A 00 54 00 |···T· 00 00 00 00

Memory content

```
[00] * 04:B5:4F 76 (UID0-UID2, BCC0)
[01] * E2:DE:22:80 (UID3-UID6)
    + 9E 48 09:00 (BCC1, INT, LOCK0-LOCK1)
    * EE:70:6B:56 (OTP0-OTP3)
     . 13 04 00 00
   . 02 14 9F BD |····
    . 02 00 01 FF
```

OTP on Transit Cards




- Looking at the OTP settings alone won't verify is a system is vulnerable or not
 - Positive Signs of doing it right
 - If OTPs are set to a logical value at time of purchase
 - OTPs change after card is used

Raw Data Dumps



Transit card data




- Top Screen: Card data PRIOR to first use
- Bottom Screen: Card data AFTER first use

Vulnerable?




- System could be validating card on backend systems
 - Remote server could keep count of card usage



Vulnerable?



- Only way to test your system...
 - is to test your system.




UltraReset

- Works on any Android device with NFC
 - (2.3.3 or later)
- Uses standard NFC API Calls

UltraReset







- Save card data on to phone
 - Pages 3 to 15 are saved to phone

Example Card

Rides left on card: 10

UltraReset






- Step 2
 - Use transit card

Example Card
Rides left on card: 8

UltraReset







- Step 3
 - Write original data back to card
 - Pages 3 to 15 are reset to originally saved data from the phone

Example Card

Rides left on card: 10

Got Issues





Flaw in the "Single" ride or temporary use cards

- Rider is typically not charged directly for the card
- However, transit system may have spent \$\$\$
- Wholesale \$0.05 to \$0.20 per card
- Cards designed to be disposable
 - should not be "refillable"

Ultralight Upgrade



- Mifare Ultralight
 - Envisioned for ticketing purposes
 - Just fine for events
 - Enter once, that's all you want. Easy to track UIDs.
 - Received upgrade: Ultralight C
 - Has same OTP bits, now called "ONE Way counter"
 - Mifare's customer education?
 - C's also support access control



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